corporations were under a strict Center for Disease Control (CDC) mandate to distribute the vaccine only to high-risk individuals, but many questioned 4 why high-risk individuals on Wall Street should fare better than high-risk individuals on Main Street. Despite the CDC's prioritization guidelines, the 5 confused and seemingly ad-hoc distribution system resulted in inequity or-at best-chance benefit to privileged groups.
During a more severe pandemic, scarce resources and ad-hoc, understaffed emergency response systems may result in far greater inequities impacting underprivileged citizens. This paper focuses on the particular 6 susceptibilities of racial and ethnic minorities, because of the complex forms of discrimination these minorities already face in our healthcare system. 7 Specifically, this paper argues that some legal rights and remedies that indirectly restrain discriminatory behavior under normal circumstances will likely be reduced or removed during emergency responses to a deadly pandemic. Of particular concern is the potential impact of reducing these 8 legal safeguards against discrimination at a time when prejudices may be heightened, resources will likely be scarce, and safeguards will be most needed. Any resulting discrimination could be devastating, given the 9 likelihood that a pandemic may prove far deadlier to minority groups. Early 10 data shows that African Americans, Latinos, and Native Americans are 150%-200% more likely to die from H1N1 than European Americans. 
4.
Deprez, supra note 2. 5.
Clark, supra note 2.
6.
See Sharona Hoffman, Preparing for Disaster: Protecting the Most Vulnerable in Emergencies, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1491 REV. (2009 [hereinafter Hoffman, Preparing for Disaster] ; David A. Farber, Disaster Law and Inequality, 25 LAW & INEQ. 297, 303-04 (2007) .
7. See infra Part I.B; see generally UNEQUAL TREATMENT: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE (Brian D. Smedley et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter UNEQUAL TREATMENT] . Notably, other complex factors such as SES and healthcare access largely contribute to racial and ethnic disparities in the health care system and will likely cause inequities during a pandemic. See Hoffman, Preparing for Disaster, supra note 6. However, socioeconomic status and access to healthcare fail to fully account for the disparate treatment racial and ethnic minorities receive in our healthcare system. See infra notes 34-41 and accompanying text; see also Eliminating Health Disparities, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/public-health/eliminating-healthdisparities.shtml (last visited Feb. 13, 2011) . Pandemic planning should address disparities on all fronts, but this article calls for recognition of the particular legal implications and susceptibilities that might arise surrounding issues of racial and ethnic discrimination.
8. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2010 , http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2010 In Section I, this paper will uncover the complex types of ethnic and racial discrimination that exist today, as well as the current state of discrimination in healthcare. Section II discusses the likelihood that, when a severe pandemic strikes, the government will reduce or eliminate legal safeguards that protect against unconscious and inadvertent discrimination. The section also discusses how these legal safeguards will be needed more than ever during a pandemic, because of severe resource shortages, ad-hoc decision-making, and the societal phenomenon of racial "scapegoating." Finally, Section III recommends that, considering the government's interventionist approach to pandemic response and coordination, it should replace the legal protections that will be reduced with other safeguards against discrimination.
I. THE FRYING PAN: RACIAL & ETHNIC DISCRIMINATION IN MEDICAL TREATMENT & RESOURCE ALLOCATION
The American Medical Association recognizes that "[Racial and ethnic d]isparities in health care exist even when controlling for gender, [health] condition, age and socio-economic status." The threat of a pandemic is 12 greatest to minorities for reasons rooted in America's prejudiced past. Minority groups face large socioeconomic hurdles, as well as entrenched, often-complex forms of discrimination in obtaining health services. This 13 section discusses the complex types of discrimination that are common today, and then addresses discrimination in healthcare, effecting disparate treatment that cannot be explained by healthcare access, education, income, age, gender, health condition, symptoms presented, or patient preference.
14

A. Understanding Twenty-First Century Discrimination
Racial disparities not attributable to socio-economic status may come as a surprise to many Americans, who largely conceptualize discrimination as a problem of the past. This perception may have a lot to do with how people 15 california-more-likely-to-die-of-h1n1-than-whites.html.
Note that this article uses the term "European Americans" rather than "Caucasian. " See Raj Bhopal & Liam Donaldson, White, European, Western, Caucasian or What? Inappropriate Labeling in Research on Race, Ethnicity and Health, 88 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1303 (1998 definition of discrimination is in some ways reinforced by the law, which generally does not recognize more subtle forms of discrimination-except in some housing, lending, voting, or employment claims. Otherwise, courts 17 presiding over discrimination claims require plaintiffs to prove that there was an intent to discriminate or racial animus in order to successfully present their claims.
18
Although courts generally require proof of intent, intentional discrimination is only the tip of the iceberg. The National Research Council has identified three other major types of discrimination. Discrimination can 19 be unconscious, can consist of statistical discrimination or profiling, and it can be perpetrated by statistics, systems, and institutions that focus on the needs of the majority to the exclusion of minorities.
20
Unconscious discrimination is "a set of often unconscious beliefs and associations that affect the attitudes and behaviors of members of the ingroup (e.g., non-Hispanic whites) toward members of the outgroup (e.g., blacks or other disadvantaged racial groups)." It may be manifested by positive 21 feelings about one group-the preferred "in-group"-rather than negative feelings about another group. Although few people exhibit explicit racism, 22 the vast majority of those studied show signs of implicit or unconscious bias against minorities. These behaviors have been well-documented and are 23 pervasive regardless of a person's level of educational achievement. Even 24 Blank et al. eds., 2004) ("Most people's concept of racial discrimination involves explicit, direct hostility expressed by whites toward members of a disadvantaged racial group.").
16. minority individuals may exhibit this preference towards the "in-group," by favoring those who are lighter skinned, a problem described as "colorism." 25 Similarly, statistical and institutional discrimination may not involve any intentional ill-will towards minority groups. Statistical discrimination, or profiling, occurs when a person "is treated differently because of information associated with his or her racial group membership." For example, if a 26 person believes that certain minority groups are more likely to exhibit criminal behavior, he or she may attribute criminality to a specific individual from that group. People might also make assumptions about a person's education, 27 abilities, health, or habits based on perceptions of average or typical characteristics of the person's racial or ethnic group. The practice may be 28 exacerbated by the tendency to see minorities based on racial, rather than individual attributes. The result is that a minority individual may have to 29 work harder, achieve more, say more, or stand out more to overcome this assumptive profiling and be treated like an average member of the majority group.
30
Institutional discrimination is even more complex. Factors which appear to be neutral may be applied selectively. For example, an irregular credit 31 history that might be brushed aside in granting a loan to a white borrower might not be waived for an African American or Latino. Another issue is that 32 neutral factors developed with only the majority in mind could fail to account for the different needs or characteristics of minority groups. For example, donor kidneys were originally allocated disproportionately based on blood antigens, without regard to the fact that antigens show differently in African Americans.
33
Signs of Race Bias in Care, BOSTON GLOBE, July 20, 2007, http Minority individuals are treated differently than European Americans in our healthcare system due to these complex forms of discrimination. Racial and ethnic minorities receive lower quality health services, less frequent screenings and procedures, reduced and delayed treatment, and experience higher mortality rates than European Americans. Socioeconomic status only 34 partially explains the problem. Although the first and primary barrier that 35 many minority citizens face in receiving medical treatment is the "ability to gain entry to the healthcare system[,]" it is not the only one. Numerous racial 36 and ethnic disparities exist in patient prognoses, diagnoses, and treatment, even after controlling for socioeconomic factors and access to healthcare.
37
The race or ethnicity of a patient often affects the healthcare treatment he or she will receive, even when controlling for income, education, gender, age, healthcare access, and health condition. This is the case when it comes to 38 numerous types of healthcare, including cancer treatments, cardiac medication, coronary artery bypass surgery, peritoneal dialysis, intensive care, emergency room care, and even prescription of pain medication. Similarly, likely to do simple blood-testing on minorities or to proscribe inexpensive medications that might prevent severe illness or death.
41
This disparate resource allocation and medical treatment may be impacted by unconscious discrimination. Physicians and healthcare workers exhibit the same tendencies towards discrimination as the general population, with some admitting explicit bias and others claiming they are not prejudiced but still exhibiting signs of unconscious bias or discrimination. Despite the fact that 42 doctors report no explicit preference for white versus black patients, a recent study testing doctors' implicit bias showed that some doctors exhibit an unconscious bias against black patients. Furthermore, the greater the bias a physician exhibited in the test, the greater the likelihood that he would fail to offer black patients clot-busting treatment as compared to white patients.
43
Actual or perceived resource shortages-such as time, personnel, or treatments-may exacerbate the problem of healthcare discrimination against racial and ethnic minorities. Dr. Thomas Inui, who studies vulnerable patient 44 groups, explained that unconscious discrimination surfaces "[w]hen we're involved with high-pressure, high-stakes decision-making, when there's a lot riding on our decisions but there isn't a lot of time to make them, that's when the implicit attitudes that are not scientific rise up and grab us." 45 Discrimination in healthcare treatment and allocation may also be caused by a combination of unconscious bias and other forms of discrimination, such as institutional discrimination, that fail to consider the needs of minorities. For example, African Americans might sometimes face unconscious discrimination by physicians who delay putting them on the kidney transplant list, and until quite recently, faced a second institutional discrimination hurdle since antigens, which show differently in African Americans, were used to match kidney recipients with donors. Although antigen-matching is no 46 longer used to prioritize kidney transplants, researchers and advocates had to 41 areas of the United States gave coroners the right to assume a deceased person's intent to donate their corneas in the absence of evidence otherwise. 49 These laws have been withdrawn in most states for a variety of reasons, but 50 while they existed, they seem to have resulted in both institutional and unconscious-or perhaps even overt-discrimination against minorities. Institutional discrimination resulted from presumed consent systems' proclivity to harvest from victims of violence (who are disproportionately minorities), and "disparities may exist when coroners or medical examiners 51 decide whether to retrieve organs or tissues from a dead person under their custody." 52 47. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Unequal Racial Access to Kidney Transplantation, 46 VAND. L. REV. 805, 808-29 (1993) During a pandemic, the government may take emergency actions that will likely have the unfortunate side effect of reducing legal safeguards against inadvertent discrimination. Although the extent to which discrimination might increase during a pandemic is unclear, this section argues that the reduction of legal safeguards might occur at a time when they might be most needed-amidst reduced resource shortages, ad-hoc decision-making, and possibly even racial "scapegoating." The potential for heightened discrimination that might be caused by these compounded factors is troubling.
Government authorities are prepared to reduce liability and individual rights in order to maximize emergency response resources and contain the threat of pandemic. Although these legal changes may be necessary and 53 proper to save lives, we must not overlook the detrimental effect such actions will likely have on removing existing protections against discrimination.
54
The reduction of legal safeguards is all the more disconcerting considering that the circumstances of a pandemic may heighten prejudices and increase the likelihood of discriminatory behaviors. People are more likely to discriminate and stigmatize racial or ethnic minorities out of fear when disease or terrorists strike. 
A. Legal Safeguards Against Discrimination Will Likely Be Reduced
Several important legal safeguards against discrimination may be reduced or eliminated as a result of governmental emergency response. Technically, equal protection rights prohibiting intentional discrimination will not be reduced (for example, claims brought under the Equal Protection Clause will not be eliminated), but this section discusses how some protections against 59 unconscious discrimination will be affected.
The Due Process Clause, which ensures that everyone's rights must be respected and that anyone can have a hearing before a government actor removes any rights, will apply differently since time and resources will be limited. Although the CDC has recognized the need for any tradeoffs and 60 procedures to be fair, the reality is that the government will have an 61 unprecedented compelling interest to infringe on substantive due process rights, and restrict citizens' right to life and liberty. Limited time, personnel, 62 and medical resources may result in reduced procedural due process if people are given short notice or little access to a meaningful hearing before they are confined or refused medical treatment. With rights reduced, and courts likely 63 working on a reduced staff while overwhelmed with requests for hearings, 64 injunctive relief may be difficult to obtain. Additionally, tort remedies, which hold healthcare workers and institutions liable for neglect or mistreatment, will be difficult to obtain. 65 JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT 299, 331 (2009) These reductions are legitimate and important tools in the effort to maximize pandemic response, and this paper does not contend that the changes are unnecessary or improper. Rather, this section argues that the reduction of legal rights, especially due process, could leave minority groups more vulnerable to discrimination at a time when they most need legal protection, and that other legal safeguards should replace those that will be eliminated.
Safety, security, and public health have always required some sacrifice of individual rights, but in a pandemic, the trade-off is likely to be far more severe than under normal circumstances. Although the CDC has recognized 69 the need for any tradeoffs and procedures to be fair, the reality is that the 70 government will have an unprecedented compelling interest to infringe on substantive due process rights, and restrict citizens' rights to life and liberty. meaningful hearing before they are confined or refused medical treatment.
72
With rights reduced and courts likely working with a reduced staff and overwhelmed with requests for hearings, injunctive relief may be difficult to obtain. Remedies will also be limited in ex post facto hearings, since emergency laws extend sovereign immunity to many workers, volunteers, organizations, and agencies in order to increase emergency response.
73
In theory, these reductions in rights will apply to all citizens equally. 74 However, even if certain rights are not legally required, European Americans are more likely to be treated well, whether that means receiving higher quality healthcare or the benefit of the doubt in front of juries or law enforcement officers. As Ayn Rand aptly put it, "the political function of rights is 75 precisely to protect minorities from oppression by majorities." Thus, the 76 reality is that legal reductions in rights will most affect minorities who are not as likely to reap the benefit of those rights without legal enforcement.
(1) Reduced Due Process Safeguards
The Due Process Clause is intertwined with Equal Protection and is essential in protecting minority rights because it ensures that everyone, 76. AYN RAND, THE VIRTUE OF SELFISHNESS 3, ch. 13 (New Am. Library, Penguin Group 1964). Similarly, American abolitionist Wendell Phillips stated that "Governments exist to protect the rights of minorities. The loved and the rich need no protection: they have many friends and few enemies." WENDELL PHILLIPS, SPEECHES, LECTURES, AND LETTERS 341 (Boston, James Redpath 1863); see also James Madison, Speech in the Virginia Constitutional Convention (Dec. 2, 1829), in JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 824 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999) ("In republics the great danger is, that the majority may not sufficiently respect the rights of the minority.").
77. This concept is also recognized in international law, which emphasizes the important role that due process rights play in protecting minorities from discrimination. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Organization of American States, Report on Terrorism and Human Rights ¶ ¶ 246 (2002) , http://www.cidh.org/Terrorism/Eng/toc.htm ("[D] ue process rights form an integral part of the judicial guarantees essential for the protection of non-derogable rights," including non-discrimination. In fact, "no human rights supervisory body has yet found the exigencies of a genuine emergency situation sufficient to justify suspending even temporarily basic fair trial safeguards."). See supra note 76. See also infra note 78 and accompanying text.
regardless of factors such as skin color, will be afforded certain fundamental rights and a fair hearing. Unfortunately, however, the Due Process Clause 78 will not provide the same substantive or procedural protections during a pandemic as it does under normal circumstances. For example, the 79 government interest in limiting the effects of a pandemic will likely be found sufficiently compelling to justify involuntary quarantine and isolation. This 80 is not to say that the due process analysis will change, but rather that the application will inevitably permit greater infringements and fewer procedural safeguards.
The dual danger to minorities is that their rights may be disproportionately infringed upon, and that with the reduction in process, minority individuals may be unable to get an injunction or restoration of those rights. Reduced due process protections are especially concerning because 81 due process applies to actions by many government organizations that will be active during a pandemic, including public health departments, the military, law enforcement, and local, state, and federal government entities, as well as public hospitals. Individuals seeking care from private hospitals are not necessarily provided due process protection, but are provided with similar 1, 12 (1967) . The court granted equal protection because it recognized marriage as a substantive due process right. ("To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis . . . so directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State's citizens of liberty without due process of law.") (emphasis added Powers Act], through the doctrine of necessity, establishes the primacy of common defense interests of the state over the due process rights of citizens in the event of a health emergency.").
80. Supra note 79. 81. It may also be difficult to receive later monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for any due process violations since federal and state triage guidelines say treatment may be denied or revoked. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 50 (1988) (explaining that a § 1983 claim may only be made against a person who acts "under color of state law," that is to say, one who "abuses the position given to him by the State."); see supra note 75.
82. Private hospitals will only be subject to the due process clause if a court determines they are "state actors," which may depend on a number of issues such as receipt of funding, regulation or inspection authority, leases, licensure, and more. Thomson Reuters, Annotation, Action of Private Hospital as State protections under EMTALA, which might also be reduced or suspended during a pandemic.
83
Substantive due process requires that the government cannot infringe upon any fundamental right unless it has a compelling reason to do so. 84 Fundamental rights, including the rights to life and liberty, are rarely revoked in cases not involving criminal or capital punishment. However, national 85 security and public health during a severe pandemic may provide a nearly insurmountable government interest that is sufficiently compelling to outweigh these fundamental rights.
86
Thus far, no governmental interest has ever been found sufficiently compelling to infringe on the life of a conscious and protesting law-abiding citizen, who might recover if given treatment. As noted in the CDC or revoking medical treatment-even removing a person from a life-sustaining ventilator without their consent-may become a necessity during a pandemic with severe medical resource shortages. According to these guidelines, a 89 compelling interest in reducing mass casualties (by allocating treatment to those most likely to survive) might warrant such infringements. It is unclear 90 how courts would view this infringement. Nonetheless, the fact that the 91 outcome is unclear shows that during a pandemic, substantive due process will tend not to protect the fundamental right to life nearly as unquestioningly as it does under normal circumstances. Arguably, patients seeking care from 92 private hospitals might not face any reduction in due process rights, if they would not have been entitled to due process rights in the first place. 93 However, as discussed in the next section, these patients' rights might be similarly reduced by a government suspension of EMTALA. 94 Similarly, procedural due process may be limited due to time, personnel, and resource constraints. Procedural due process rights requiring notice and opportunity to be heard will be especially important to ensure equality if the 95 government determines it is necessary to infringe on citizens' rights during a pandemic. This is because procedural due process provides assurance that 96 if a healthcare right or entitlement becomes scarce and must be limited, it will be limited on a fair basis that is unrelated to race or ethnicity. [G] overnments are sometimes tempted to use their quarantine powers as an instrument of prejudice against vulnerable individuals or populations."); Ahmad, supra note 56, at 1278 (noting that in profiling schemes, "African American and Latino appearance has been equated with criminality"); David A. Harris, Driving While Black: Racial Profiling on Our Nation's Highways, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION SPECIAL REPORT (June 1999), http://www.aclu.org/racial-justice/driving-while-black-racial-profiling-our-nations-highways.
103. Parmet, supra note 102, at 621 (federal quarantine authority is arguably unconstitutional "because it does not give individuals subject to isolation or quarantine orders a right to a fair hearing").
104. unthinkable that a person in the United States could be deprived of their life without a chance to at least argue their case in court. And yet, hospital triage guidelines do not mention any need for a triage officer to wait for a trial or its outcome before removing someone from a ventilator. Given predicted 106 shortages in a worst-case scenario, this may be realistic, but it is not clear whether the courts will determine that a decision by a team of doctors or the chance to plead with the triage officer will count as an "opportunity to be heard," or-once again-the extent to which procedural due process will apply to a private hospital not considered a government actor. The issue is 107 that if courts determine that an actual trial before a judge is necessary, they may be flooded with representatives of patients who want to have their cases heard. Since the court system, like other institutions, may be operating with reduced personnel due to illness, it is not clear to what extent hearings will 108 be possible.
Due process "secures libertarian protections at the [individual] level that are important when the group is socially despised." Since minority 109 individuals may be more likely to be refused medical treatment, quarantined, or have their rights otherwise infringed upon, any reduced protections of the due process clause may hit minority groups the hardest. At the very least, reduced protections remove an important safeguard against discrimination.
(2) Suspension of EMTALA Another safeguard against discrimination that might be reduced or lost during a pandemic is the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA The suspension of EMTALA will doubtlessly affect European Americans as well as minorities, but it is important to recognize the different role that EMTALA plays for these groups. EMTALA ensures European Americans simply that they will receive treatment, and not be turned away based on socioeconomic factors. However, EMTALA provides an additional important assurance to minority individuals that they will not be turned away based on the color of their skin.
114
EMTALA is an important safeguard against discrimination because it prohibits anyone with a serious medical condition from being turned away for any reason-no proof of intentional discrimination is required. In effect,
115
EMTALA prevents both inadvertent discrimination and discrimination which is purposeful but difficult to prove. If EMTALA is suspended, minority individuals whose treatment is refused or revoked will no longer be protected from being turned away based on discrimination that is subconscious, institutional, or even discrimination that is intentional but cannot be proven. These individuals will have to turn to Equal Protection and Title VI claims, which both require proof of discriminatory intent. Injunctive relief, which 116 requires that a claim must be likely to succeed, will be difficult to obtain. 
(3) Expanded Immunities and Reduced Tort Remedies
Sovereign immunity will likely be expanded during a pandemic to increase emergency response and absolve humanitarian actors from liability for circumstances beyond their control. Unfortunately, expanded immunity 118 may also have the detrimental effect of reducing safeguards against discrimination.
119
Governmental immunity generally protects state and federal entities from being sued for damages or retroactive relief, unless they choose to waive the protection, and is usually available to state and federal officials, depending on the circumstances of the specific case. Normally, immunity does not extend 120 to local governments or to any entity not considered an arm of the state. 121 However, under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act, some immunity will also extend to civil suits against local government actors during a pandemic.
122
Various federal laws also extend some form of immunity to government responders and healthcare workers who volunteer during a pandemic, as 356, 375-76 (1990) and stating that entities such as municipal and local governments and school boards, which may be sued for constitutional violations under § 1983, cannot receive immunity as they are not an arm of the state).
122. Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 247d-6d(i)(2)-(7) (West 2010). PREP will likely reduce tort liability for local government actors. However, it is unclear whether this immunity will impact the analysis of § 1983 claims, which may normally be brought against municipal and local governments. See id. This is because § 1983 claims require proof that the actor misused or abused the law (acting "under color of law"), which would likely trigger the willful misconduct exception to PREP immunity in many cases, thus allowing at least some § 1983 claims to continue. See Townsend v. Moya, 291 F.3d 859, 861 (5th Cir. 2002) The immunity that will apply differs depending on the law involved. However, most laws will provide immunity for ordinary negligence as long as a person has acted in good faith, but make exceptions for gross negligence or for wanton or willful misconduct. Since they will not be liable for ordinary 128 negligence, covered physicians and other healthcare workers will have greater discretion and wider latitude to depart from accepted norms. They will only be held liable for deviations that are sufficiently severe to be considered grossly negligent, or sufficiently obvious that any misconduct could be proven willful. Of course, the extent of discretion they are granted may depend on whether the entity they are working under is also provided immunity. Nonetheless, healthcare workers who would not be afforded immunity under normal circumstances will receive immunity if they volunteer in a pandemic (or if they are working in some other covered capacity) and may feel that they have wider latitude in how they administer care.
Unfortunately, minority individuals may be more vulnerable to discrimination if covered physicians and healthcare workers are granted more discretion and wider latitude in decision-making. 129. See supra note 58. Situations that call for rushed judgments, especially, may result in reliance on stereotypes as physicians are more likely ask leading questions, and "to interpret ambiguous information as confirming expectations [,] " and it may also "lead doctors unwittingly to prescribe . . . treatment choices that are less than optimal." WANG, DISCRIMINATION BY DEFAULT, supra note 116, at 131; Bloche, supra note 36, at 103-04 (Because "race-related preconceptions" may affect clinical judgment, physician discretion in decisionmaking may result in unconscious discrimination.); Harris, The Stories, The Statistics, and the Law, supra note 75, at 302 (explaining how the expansion of police discretion has increased discriminatory behavior).
130. People "tend to pay more attention to individualized information . . . and to consider how external factors might be affecting their conduct . . . [when] they are motivated to make accurate judgments (as opposed to confirming their predictions) and when they are aware that their decisions will be compared discretion allow unconscious discrimination to go unchecked and exacerbate its effects. For example, organizations with "personnel systems whose 131 criteria for making decisions are arbitrary and subjective are highly vulnerable to [unconscious] bias due to the influence of stereotypes-as . . . when individual managers have a great deal of discretion with little in the way of written guidelines or effective oversight."
132
As a result of extended immunities, it will also be more difficult to seek a remedy for any subconscious discrimination that leads to a covered physician's negligence or mistreatment. Even under normal circumstances, a physician's personal biases may lead to passive inattention towards the needs of certain minority individuals or groups. In such cases, it would be difficult 133 if not impossible to prove an equal protection claim, since the minority individual or group would have to show that the physician had the intent to discriminate. However, the physician's actions might normally be the basis 134 for a malpractice claim, or at least a negligence claim. Thus, if doctors are granted immunity during a pandemic, patients and their families who are unable to prove the doctor had an intent to discriminate may be left with little recourse. They would have to prove that the doctor was grossly negligent or willfully engaged in misconduct. Thus, expanding available immunities will 135 likely reduce yet another important safeguard against discrimination.
B. Fear and Racial Scapegoating
The reduction of legal safeguards during a pandemic is all the more troubling because of the danger that racial prejudices will be heightened through a phenomenon sometimes referred to as racial "scapegoating. (1992) . See also id. at 2 ("In 1982, U.S. public health officials inferred that Haitians per se were in some way at risk for AIDS," and in a typical commentary "one reporter termed the incidence of AIDs in Haitians 'a clue from the grave, as though a zombie, leaving a trail of unwinding gauze bandages and rotting flesh, had come to the hospital's Grand Rounds to pronounce a curse.'").
147 We were in a space cordoned off with barbed wire. Wherever they put you, you were meant to stay right there; there was no place to move. The latrines were brimming over. There was never any cool water to drink, to wet our lips. There was only water in a cistern, boiling in the hot sun. When you drank it, it gave you diarrhea. . . . Rats crawled over us at night. . . . When we saw all these things, we thought, it's not possible, it can't go on like this. We're humans, just like everyone else. she may be more likely to intentionally or inadvertently discriminate against others who are perceived to be members of the blamed racial group. Racial "scapegoating" might increase people's likelihood to intentionally or inadvertently discriminate. Like statistical discrimination, the practice of 160 racial "scapegoating" may be exacerbated by the tendency to see minorities based on racial, rather than individual attributes.
161
"Mexicans have become subject to stigma and discrimination"); Anti-immigrant groups used the H1N1 outbreak as a platform to promote discrimination against Mexicans, and Latinos generally. 161. See supra note 29; Ramirez et al., supra note 27, at 1195-96 (there was widespread justification of using race to signal criminality following the 9/11 terror attacks); see also infra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
Additionally, racial tensions may be heightened because, if and when a deadly pandemic strikes, we may not know for some time if it is the result of a bioterrorist attack or some naturally spread virus. If the pandemic is 162 perceived to be associated with terrorism, we can be sure that discriminatory behavior will ensue.
Hate crimes spiked following the events of 165. Following the 9/11 terror attacks, numerous organizations reported that crime surges against Arab-Americans and Sikhs increased by as much as seventeen-fold with incident estimates ranging from over four hundred to nearly two thousand, and surveys of Muslims and Arab-Americans indicated that far more incidents likely went unreported due to gaps in the hate-crime reporting system. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, "We Are Not the Enemy" Hate Crimes Against Arabs, Muslims, and Those Perceived to be Arab or Muslim after September 11, 14(6)(G) HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 15-16 (2002) .
166. Acts of hate and prejudice were largely empathized with in the aftermath of September 11th, both by private citizens and governmental messages of fear and profiling. Ahmad, supra note 56, at 1295-99, 1317-20. 167. Id. at 1262 (discussing the "mutually reinforcing relationship between individual hate crimes and governmental racial profiling"); id. at 1320 ("Just as homosexual sodomy laws can be said to express "the official 'theory' of homophobia," racial profiling policies script a state theory of racial subordination. What is fundamentally different in the post-September 11 context, however, is that it is not only private citizens who put the state theory into practice. Rather, through its direct engagement in racial profiling, the state is an active participant in the process as well.").
Most people are not likely to commit hateful acts of violence, and concerted action against a racial or ethnic minority in today's society seems absurd, though a few have advocated for "dusting off" Korematsu and instituting racially-based quarantines. What is more likely is that many 168 individuals may discriminate, even subconsciously, if certain racial groups are perceived as "terrorists" or "disease carriers." 169 Healthcare workers will be under immense psychological and emotional strain as the country faces an unprecedented situation, and it is difficult to 170 predict how they might subconsciously or intentionally react to such racial fears and "scapegoating." One hospital director described the strain when he had to turn patients away during a recent pandemic drill involving shortages of ventilators and hospital beds. When a pandemic strikes, minority groups may be vulnerable to increased discrimination due to racial scapegoating. The aftermath of September 11 teaches us that such discrimination may be easy to rationalize because it is based on a fear that is widely-shared and may seem logical. Scapegoating 174 may also seem justified by the remote threat of governmentally-sanctioned discrimination that lingers as long as Korematsu remains law. Safeguards 175 against discrimination will be more important than ever, so any safeguards that must be reduced due to legal changes during a pandemic should be replaced with other legal and policy protections. 
C. Predicted Scarcities and the Accompanying Threat of Discrimination
To make matters worse, governmental and medical authorities predict that a pandemic or bio-terrorist attack will likely be accompanied by major medical preventive and treatment shortages. Since aggressive, high-tech, 176 complex, time-consuming, and scarce medical resources are already less likely to go to minority individuals because of complex forms of discrimination, 177 it stands to reason that the situation could become worse when life-saving resources are further constricted during a pandemic or bioterrorist attack, especially if the tendency is exacerbated by racial "scapegoating." This 178 section discusses how our nation's emergency response system is especially vulnerable to increased racial and ethnic discrimination in the allocation and distribution of scarce medical resources.
Medical ethicists and authorities believe that since the threat of a pandemic or bioterrorist attack is an equally shared societal risk, prevention and treatment resources should be shared equally as well. Risks that are 180. Thus, the resource distribution discussed in this paper, such as vaccine distribution, should be distinguished from the philosophy of wealth redistribution. Wealth redistribution is controversial because private actors who create wealth bear many individual risks, and many argue that wealth should not be distributed to those who have not borne similar risks. See, e.g., Culhane, supra note 179, at 177-78.
181. Culhane, supra note 179, at 177-78. ethicists is that the burden of these risks should be shared by all members of society.
182
(
1) The Threat of Medical Shortages
Luckily, the 2009 vaccine shortage discussed in the introduction became a surplus within a few weeks, and the 2009 H1N1 epidemic was far less communicable and deadly than predicted. Although disaster was averted, 183 the world had already faced two other pandemic scares in the past decade, and scientists predict that it is only a matter of time until the next deadly pandemic strikes. Worst-case scenarios point to the 1918 Spanish Influenza, which 184 infected one-third of the global population of 1.8 billion, killing 20 to 50 million people worldwide and an estimated 675,000 Americans.
185
Federal and state governments have undertaken extensive planning efforts and legislative enactments in preparation for the inevitable pandemic. Nonetheless, a congressional commission recently found that the United States is "seriously lacking" in its capability to provide resources including adequate 182. See supra note 179. Notably, the application of distributive justice principles to mass casualty events (and organ allocation) does not stir the controversy that it does in application to healthcare resources, generally. See, e.g., CDC ETHICS SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 61; Samia A. Hurst et al., Allocating Resources in Humanitarian Medicine, 2 PUB. HEALTH ETHICS 89, 89-90 (2009); Persad et al., supra note 179. When it comes to "resource allocation decisions, protracted crises differ from acute crises in important ways." Hurst et al., supra, at 90. One notable difference is the extreme scarcity of resources such as organs and potentially lifesaving care in a mass-casualty event. Persad et al., supra note 179. Perhaps another difference (especially in the mass casualty event) is based on "the rule of rescue, 'the imperative people feel to rescue identifiable individuals facing avoidable death.'" Hurst et al., supra, at 89. The rule of rescue implies "that an identifiable, immediate victim should have priority over distant 'statistical' lives." Id. The acute urgency of a pandemic and the pressing need of its immediately identifiable victims may thus more readily justify the argument that resources should be distributed to those victims without regard to their purchasing power. SCI. 77, 77-80 (2005) . medical supplies, distribution methods, treatment, and preventive measures. 186 This was especially troubling since the virus was milder than predicted and 187 the country had months to prepare for H1N1-time that they would not have to prepare for a deadlier bioterrorist attack or pandemic with natural causes. 188 The types of resources that will likely be in very short supply include vaccines, anti-viral drugs, personal protective equipment, hospital beds, ventilators, doctors, and healthcare workers. Fortunately, because the H1N1 189 epidemic was relatively mild, the only major shortage that the American public experienced was the vaccine shortage; but, the shortage was glaring nonetheless. In a deadly pandemic, we will most likely be faced with more 190 than just a shortage of vaccines. For example, ventilators are an important medical resource which may be vital to save lives during a pandemic, but will likely be in very short supply. Currently there are about 62,000 ventilators 191 in the United States (plus some small emergency stockpiles), but experts 192 predict that anywhere from 163,000 to 750,000 people will need to be ventilated in a pandemic similar to the 1918 influenza. Furthermore, 193 intensive care unit (ICU) needs could exceed 364% of capacity.
194
Researchers are working to diminish the impact of some predictable medical shortages, but even in the unlikely event that some of these issues 196. For instance, even if vaccine production is improved using cell-based technology it may not be able to be developed and distributed as quickly as a virus could proliferate. The H1N1 vaccine took months to produce, and unfortunately new cell-culture technologies are only "somewhat" faster in speeding up vaccine production. Roos, supra note 195. Similarly, the government is working to increase the number of stockpiled ventilators for emergencies, but shortages will likely still be experienced in the case of a nationwide threat and that " [l] ittle is known about the success of mechanical-ventilator stockpiling for mass casualty respiratory failure." Branson et al., supra note 189, at 78. Another problem is the availability of persons trained to operate the ventilators. See generally Hanley, supra note 192 (acknowledging that in the case of a nationwide crisis such as a pandemic or bioterrorist attack respiratory therapists from outside the regions will likely be unavailable, staff resources will be depleted by the event, and other than local volunteers, few resources will be available).
197. CENTER FOR BIOSECURITY OF UPMC, supra note 176, at 13-14, 33 (discussing the drastic resource shortages that will likely occur-especially in hospital capacity and personnel-and concluding that some improvements are possible, but will take "a number of years" to accomplish).
198. See Katz, supra note 57, at 799-801 (discussing the difficulty in predicting shortages, particularly in the event of a bioterrorist attack). who should receive access. Committee members considered a number of 199 factors including net worth, past societal contributions, and future potential.
200
Although the arbitrary and subjective allocation used by the "God Committee" has long since been eschewed by ethicists and the medical community, any allocation system will in essence be "Playing God" by determining who gets to receive scarce medical resources and live. Since 201 medical ethicists today agree that equality is important, more recent organ 202 allocation systems have attempted to set up objective systems by limiting criteria to more quantitative data such as matching blood antigens (kidneys) or time spent on the waiting list (livers). However, both of these systems 203 were abandoned because of their disparate impact on minorities: antigenmatching reduced the likelihood of a kidney transplant since antigens show differently in African Americans, and African Americans were much more likely to join the liver waiting list too late, likely due to less healthcare access. 204 How should life-saving treatment be rationed in a pandemic? Governmental and medical authorities and ethicists have begun to grapple with this question and largely agree that a first-come, first-served method 205 will not work during a deadly pandemic or bioterrorist attack. States, 206 hospitals, and the CDC have begun developing guidelines for priority, triage, and even refusal of-or removal from-care. Many plans anticipate that 207 there will be a need not only to ration ventilator treatment and hospital beds, but to remove patients who are not improving, even without the consent of patients or their families.
208
While equitable distribution of healthcare resources may normally be a controversial topic, ethicists and authorities tend to agree that in a pandemic 209 situation with very scarce resources and the looming threat of mass casualties, treatment should not be determined based on purchasing power. This 210 determination is consistent with organ allocation systems, which attempt to distribute scarce organs based on equitable criteria other than wealth. 211 Thus, pandemic triage and allocation guidelines agree that resources should be distributed equitably, according to factors independent of wealth, although the specific prioritization criteria differ by state and hospital. For example, New York and Utah recommend regular assessment of each individual's likelihood of survival in determining whether they should be placed on or removed from ventilators, while Florida's plan suggests a 212 similar assessment for allowing hospital access focused on "providing the greatest good for the greatest number." Other proposed frameworks include 213 the life cycle principle (favoring younger people over older people), fair chances (using a lottery system to award treatment), and the "multiplier effect" (vaccinating healthcare workers who can then save other lives), life expectancy, quality of life, patients who will respond to treatment most rapidly, or some combination of the above methods. The CDC has recommended a different approach for prioritizing vaccine access than for prioritizing ventilator access. It recommends distributing vaccines according to people most at risk of death from the virus, as well as based on the "multiplier effect." For ventilator rationing, it recommends incorporating 215 multiple principles to arrive at a composite priority score. However The development of ethical guidelines and principles in rationing scarce medical resources is important to ensure predictability, maintain the public trust, and uphold the rule of law. It is also the first line of defense against 218 discrimination, increasing the likelihood of consistent application regardless of race or ethnicity. 219 However, the danger is that some recommended guidelines, which appear and attempt to be facially neutral, may in effect inadvertently disfavor minority individuals. One example is that systems may fail to consider biological or genetic differences in minority individuals, such as when the kidney allocation system overlooked the fact that antigens show differently in African Americans. However, by focusing on the needs of the majority, 220 allocation systems may also fail to account for differences in health due to past healthcare access. This is an important nexus that may lead to further advocates combination); Mark S. Stein, The Distribution of Life-Saving Medical Resources: Equality, Life Expectancy, and Choice Behind the Veil, 19 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 212, no. 2, 2002 at 212, 212 ( lacked access to quality health care-or has been discriminated against in the past-be refused life-saving medical treatment? If the answer is yes, minorities will again be disproportionately affected.
226
Thus, existing guidelines leave something to be desired in assuring that minority individuals are afforded an equal chance to receive rationed healthcare. Since a lottery system may be too complicated to administer, some argue a system that favors younger people over older people or that assesses multiple factors may be the most equitable. However, adjusted guidelines 227 alone-even if tested and shown to have an equitable impact-will not 221. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS EVALUATION, BIOTERRORISM AND HEALTH CARE DISPARITIES (Mar. 8, 2002 ) ("Our review finds that the government does not have a plan to ensure that all groups, be they . . . ethnic, or racial, will receive prompt, sufficient, and systematic treatment following a biological attack . . . . An underlying weakness of the nation's health care system is that it ignores the nexus between population group membership and the receipt of health care. Health care disparities exist between various population groups. Past failures to take disparities into account give rise to questions about the government's readiness to treat all Americans if bioterrorism escalates."), http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/biotrbrf/paper.htm. eliminate the threat of discrimination, especially since already-existing 228 tendencies to discriminate may be magnified by racial "scapegoating."
(3) Ad-Hoc Decision-Making and Reduced Transparency
Minority groups might also disproportionately suffer the effects of shortages based on ad-hoc, disorganized or arbitrary macro-level distribution among hospitals and communities. Ad-hoc distribution systems could result in shortages that are far more severe in minority communities, especially given the possibility that a pandemic might prove far deadlier among minority groups than among European Americans. As we learned all too well during 229 Hurricane Katrina, availability of supplies will do nothing if adequate distribution methods are not in place. 230 As discussed in the introduction, vaccine supply and distribution faced major challenges during the recent H1N1 epidemic. The CDC coordinated 231 vaccine orders, notifying the states as doses became available, and each state developed its own vaccine delivery plan. Foreseeing shortages, the CDC 232 prioritized high risk groups that should be first to receive the vaccine, including pregnant women, caregivers for children younger than six months, healthcare and emergency medical services personnel, children, and people aged 25 through 64 years old with certain health conditions.
233
The issue that was not adequately addressed was which high risk individuals should receive vaccinations before others-an issue highlighted in the controversy surrounding the vaccine shipments to Wall Street banking corporations. Although it does not appear that any intentional favoritism 234 was shown, the hurried and confused distribution process resulted in a situation where high-risk individuals associated with a powerful bank were better able to obtain vaccinations than high risk individuals who had no such connections. Similarly, early data shows that underserved areas received a disproportionate share of vaccines in L.A. County. With the potential for 235 abuse evident, more research should be done to determine how better distribution systems can guard against any institutional discrimination that might be caused by disproportionate distribution, as well as remove any room for discretion or discrimination. 236 Furthermore, regardless of what allocation or prioritization systems are put in place, some level of discretion will inevitably be required of physicians at the micro-level and of distribution centers at the macro-level. Where there is discretion, there is room for overt and subconscious discrimination, especially if there is a lack of accountability to the public.
Thus, 237 overwhelmed hospital and distribution center staffs and hurried decisionmaking may further exacerbate the problem by reducing the likelihood of accountability and transparency.
III. DOUSING THE FLAMES: MEASURES THAT MIGHT OFFSET REDUCED LEGAL SAFEGUARDS
A laissez-fare approach to discrimination during a pandemic is hardly appropriate given the government's interventionist role in pandemic response. During a pandemic, emergency response action by the government 238 will reduce legal safeguards against inadvertent discrimination, barring minority groups to all but intentional discrimination claims, which are notoriously difficult to prove. Additionally, the government has indicated 239 that it will intervene in the healthcare system through methods including distribution of emergency resources, recommending guidelines for triage and 214-15 (2006) (Explaining that government should be responsible for its role in heightening ethnic and racial disparities during natural disasters, the author states that: "[N]atural disasters magnify the Government's contribution to public health disparities so that they are easy to identify and examine. . . ." And "because of the centrality of the Government's responsibility to manage the impact of natural disasters, these crises allow for a focus on the legal solutions available to address government sponsored public health discrimination.").
239. See, e.g., supra note 134. rationing, deploying military personnel, control of health supplies and facilities, and response organization.
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This section argues that under the authority of its obligation to ensure that no one is denied equal protection of the laws, the government should replace the safeguards it will be lifting with other protections against discrimination. The best way to do so may be to allow plaintiffs to simply prove that they were disparately impacted rather than requiring them to prove that the discrimination was intentional. Legal advocates can also explore methods of challenging current pandemic plans that may result in inequity. They can also press for additional legislation to protect racial and ethnic minorities and to increase the level of transparency and accountability in the distribution of pandemic resources and response.
A. Create a Disparate Impact Remedy That Will Apply During Pandemic Emergencies
Providing a disparate impact remedy against racial or ethnic discrimination during a pandemic may help to counteract the reductions of other legal safeguards against discrimination. Although remedies may sound reactionary rather preventive by nature, the disparate impact doctrine was engineered not only to provide post-facto remedies, but to encourage providers to prevent discrimination by addressing potential problems in a prophylactic way. As one scholar explains, the origins of disparate impact doctrine lie "in 241 a pro-business, regulatory-partnership model embraced by moderate civil rights leaders. Activists . . . envisioned using law to engineer social change, not primarily by resorting to the courts, but rather by encouraging employers to reflect on and take action suited to their situations." Thus, Congress 242 should consider passing a statute that will permit discrimination claims in a pandemic situation to be brought based on a disparate impact analysis. Rather than being required to prove discriminatory intent, plaintiffs would simply 243 have to show that pandemic-related resources were disproportionately distributed to minority individuals or groups. Not only would the remedy reduce the burden of proof required to prove discrimination, but it would provide an additional safeguard by alerting healthcare providers and emergency responders that they will be held accountable for the fair distribution of resources, regardless of their intent.
Disparate impact claims are already permitted in employment, housing, lending, and voting. Like the special circumstances in these arenas, 244 Congress should recognize that the circumstances surrounding a pandemic call for increased protection, especially given government's active role in reducing other safeguards. 245 The cause of action for a disparate impact claim regarding pandemic response could be similar to the elements of disparate impact claims recognized in other areas of the law. In order to prove a prima facie case of minorities. The burden would then shift to the defendant to prove that the disparate impact was justifiable, and also to disprove any claim made by the plaintiff that another less-discriminatory alternative was available.
At first glance it might seem that provision of a disparate impact remedy could open the door too wide and add confusion to a system that will likely be overwhelmed during a pandemic. However, this solution is not likely to destabilize emergency response. Although proof of intent is not required, disparate impact claims are still difficult to prove and not widely used. 247 Nonetheless, lack of use does not diminish the potential effect of a disparate impact remedy in safeguarding against discrimination. The disparate impact 248 doctrine has played an important role in addressing employment discrimination, although few cases go to court or succeed. The remedy is 249 considered by many to be particularly useful because of its preventive effects. " [T] he force of disparate impact law ultimately lies, not merely in 250 litigation victories, but also in shaping employers' incentives." Lawyers 251 counsel employers to self-scrutinize their practices and, historically, "the threat of being hauled into court helped motivate employers to cooperate with . . . suggestions to assess and overhaul traditional employment practices."
Allowing disparate impact claims may even increase trust in emergency responders and in the rule of law. Furthermore, cases that go to trial will 253 likely be less costly and complex to litigate than cases involving questions of consent. A disparate impact approach would have the additional benefit of 254 reducing blame, since no one would be scrutinized for malicious intent, and 255 punitive damages would likely be unavailable. Attention would be placed 256 on the object of the action rather than the morality of the actor. This focus will be especially relevant during a pandemic, when solving the problem will be more important than pinning the blame on public servants and emergency responders who may have made bad decisions under immense pressure.
B. Explore Legal Advocacy and Litigation Regarding Current Pandemic Planning
Legal advocates should look for ways to address the reduction of legal safeguards and the potential disparities before a pandemic strikes. For example, advocates could explore the availability (or creation) of injunctive remedies to challenge existing emergency plans which they believe will have an inequitable impact on racial or ethnic minorities should a pandemic strike. The City of Los Angeles was recently found liable under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) for not adequately preparing for the needs of persons with disabilities in the city's emergency disaster planning. Although the 257 ADA and the needs of persons with disabilities clearly raise distinctly different issues and legal remedies, the case demonstrates the potential for proactively and preventatively challenging emergency response plans and the legal issues and inequities such plans might create.
In the context of racial and ethnic discrimination, preventive claims would undoubtedly face obstacles such as standing and ripeness. However, to the extent that emergency planning programs might be shown to inequitably impact racial and ethnic minorities, these obstacles might prove 253. See supra note 218; infra note 268. 254. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U. S. 613, 645-48 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing the costs and complexities associated with litigating questions of intent in discrimination cases).
255. The availability of disparate impact claims arguably focuses people on "the benefits of encouraging employer rationality and fairness in employment practices" rather than on retroactive investigations into retroactive investigations into malintent. 
C. Create Structural Support for Legal Advocacy and Disparate Impact Claims
During a pandemic, the potential risk of increased racial and ethnic discrimination and the concurrent reduction of legal safeguards against such discrimination create a threat too real to ignore. At a time when they may be desperately needed, protections must be put in place to counteract the effects of governmentally reduced legal safeguards.
Legal advocates should press for abrogating immunity in disparate impact claims specific to pandemic response, providing for due process hearings, and mandating increased transparency. Additionally, the CDC or Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) should test rationing procedures for disparate impact, and provide training on the dangers of discrimination in a pandemic.
(1) Waive, Abrogate, or Deny Immunity Congress should add the availability of disparate impact claims to existing bodies of emergency law, allowing for compensatory damages as well as injunctive relief. In the statute(s) creating disparate impact remedies for 261 emergencies, Congress should consider waiving federal immunity, abrogating 258. In the ADA challenge, the City's emergency planning was considered an existing governmental program, therefore permitting claims to be brought against the program itself, regardless of the fact no actual emergency had taken place. See id. at 23.
259. See, e.g., Platton, supra note 241, at 652 ("[T] he primary purpose of the disparate impact theory is to remove barriers to employment opportunity that disproportionately burden women or racial or ethnic minorities. It is available to challenge both objective employment standards, such as standardized tests, and also subjective practices, such as job interviews, in which supervisors' exercise of discretion has a disparate impact.").
260. For example, one scholar has suggested a detailed litigation strategy to address inequity in disaster response, claiming misuse of government funding under the Civil False Claim's Act's qui tam provision. Matthew, supra note 238, at 233-34.
261. See supra Part III.A.
state immunity, and denying immunity to individuals and organizations that 262 would otherwise be granted immunity during a pandemic response. Immunity will likely be important to emergency response since healthcare providers cannot be expected to uphold normal standards of care during a pandemic, and expanded immunities will likely be important to increase healthcare workers' and volunteers' response. However, there should be a way to allow for 263 general immunity while recognizing that disparate treatment and discrimination (including unconscious and institutional discrimination) should not be tolerated under any circumstances.
(2) Provide Hearings, Perhaps Through an Administrative Board
Currently, CDC emergency planning guidelines that anticipate removing people from life-sustaining treatment in order to give others a chance plan to give notice to the patient and their family, but do not explicitly plan for some type of hearing to be granted. Similarly, state plans fail to mention whether 265 patients will have any opportunity to have their case be heard. Although internal triage officers or panels are sometimes anticipated, it is not clear whether the person will actually get a hearing, or whether decisions may be appealed. The government should consider plans that would allow hearings to take place, especially hearings for claims of discrimination. For example, options could include allowing these decisions to be appealed, especially if they involve discrimination claims, or perhaps setting up an administrative review board similar to the EEOC. A viable plan to allow hearings, especially with claims of discrimination, is important not only in the interest of justice, but to bring legitimacy when the rule of law may be destabilized and precarious at best.
(3) Plan for Increased Transparency
Information and demographic data on all resources that have been distributed, denied, or withdrawn, must be recorded and available. Tracking this data will help to keep healthcare officials cognizant and accountable. 267 Additionally, any disparate impact will be visible to the public and to individuals who may use the data to get preliminary injunctions on a disparate impact claim (if such a claim is made available). Finally, making such information transparent and available will likely have the added impact of increasing citizens' trust in the process and rule of law.
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Additionally, to guard against the potential of supply chain abuse or misuse to disproportionately deprive minority groups of access to vaccine or other medical resources, transparent and accountable distribution plans should be developed and made public for comment prior to the onset of an epidemic. Well-connected individuals should not disproportionately benefit from hurried or disorganized supply chain management.
(4) Conduct Testing on Recommended Rationing Procedures and Point Systems
The original liver and kidney distribution systems demonstrate that when rationing systems are designed with the majority in mind or with a focus on saving the most lives possible, differences are ignored or overlooked, and the system has a detrimental and disparate impact on minority groups. Recommended guidelines should be tested for disparate impact on minority groups, and appropriately adjusted. Some guidelines give vague recommendations, which should be specified sufficiently so that they may be of the legitimacy of the governmental action. The public is more likely to agree to liberty-limiting powers if there is recourse for challenging those that are perceived as unjust.").
267. See WANG, DISCRIMINATION BY DEFAULT, supra note 116, at 143-44 ("Data collection would compel institutions to 'think about race,'" and increase the likelihood that decisions will be made based on accurate judgments, rather than confirmed predictions.); Hoffman,Preparing for Disaster, supra note 6, at 1540-46 (recommending enhanced accountability and detailed emergency planning guidance to counteract the potentially devastating impacts of disasters on vulnerable populations). See also supra notes 58, 127-32, 219.
268. Annas et al., supra note 130, at 37 ("In order to obtain the support of the public for any rationing scheme, it must be developed prior to a pandemic, have broad public input, be reasonable, and be subject to revision as new information is obtained."). See also supra note 218.
269. See supra notes 230-36. tested. Testing results could be made available to the public to increase their confidence in the system and the rule of law.
(5) Provide Training on Disparate Impact and the Dangers of Discrimination in a Pandemic
Additionally, potential emergency responders should be trained regarding the dangers of increased discrimination when resources are scarce, fear and discretion are increased, and laws are changed. When people are aware of the circumstances under which they might tend to inadvertently discriminate, it is easier for them to avoid doing so. People are also less likely to 270 discriminate when they are aware that they will be held accountable, so 271 responders should also be made aware that to compensate for reduced legal safeguards against discrimination in a pandemic, the government will prohibit systems or conduct that result in a disparate impact on minorities. They should also understand that data and demographic information will be recorded and available to the public.
IV. CONCLUSION
During a pandemic, reduced legal safeguards against racial and ethnic discrimination, combined with resource shortages, ad-hoc decision-making, the potential for racial scapegoating, and the problem of discrimination in healthcare, could add up to a disastrous situation for our country's minority 270. Individuals "are more likely to act (albeit unconsciously) upon stereotypes of racial minorities when they are not (consciously) confronted with potential biases and preconceptions they may hold of racial minorities." Andrew W. Bribriesco, Latino/a Plaintiffs and the Intersection of Stereotypes, Unconscious Bias, Race-Neutral Policies, and Personal Injury, 13 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 373 (2010) Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 , 1167 , 1213 ("Equipped with conscious self-awareness, well-intentioned employers become capable of complying with the law's proscriptive injunction not to discriminate. They will monitor their decision-making processes and prevent prohibited factors from affecting their judgments.").
271. The effects of unconscious biases "can be minimized when judgments are based on timely and relevant information; when decision makers evaluate that information consistently with respect to clearly articulated criteria; and when a mechanism exists for holding decision makers accountable for the process they have used and criteria they have applied in making their judgments." Bielby, supra note 131, at 124. See also supra notes 58, 129-32, 219. citizens. We cannot afford to let a chaotic situation, infused with fear, to so disparately and disproportionately burden minority communities.
Legal advocates and federal, state, and local governments should act quickly so that if and when a pandemic or bioterrorist attack strikes, protections will be in place to ensure that the impact of discrimination on minority communities does not rise to a level even greater than normal due to governmental reduction of safeguards. It may be acceptable to allow greater restrictions on everyone's individual rights, but it should never be acceptable to permit more discrimination against a few.
